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Abstract 
Previous research has reported that walking through a doorway to a new location makes 
memory for objects and events experienced in the previous location less accurate. This effect, 
termed the location updating effect, has been used to suggest that location changes are used to 
mark boundaries between events in memory: memories for objects encountered within the 
current event are more available than those from beyond an event boundary. Within a 
computer-generated memory task, participants navigated through virtual rooms, walking 
through doorways, and interacting with objects. The accuracy and their subjective experience 
of their memory for the objects (remember/know and confidence) were assessed. The 
findings showed that shifts in location decreased accurate responses associated with the 
subjective experience of remembering but not those associated with the experience of 
knowing, even when considering only the most confident responses in each condition. These 
findings demonstrate that a shift in location selectively impacts recollection and so 
contributes to our understanding of boundaries in event memory.   
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Introduction. 
Although we are subjected to a continuous stream of perception and behaviour (punctuated 
by periods of sleep), our memory experience is, in contrast, of a series of events or episodes 
(e.g. drinking a coffee, attending a meeting) around which our memories are structured 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  Episodic memory is the memory for events in one’s life 
and is associated with a conscious recollection of the event being remembered (Tulving 1983; 
Tulving 2002). Tulving (1983) defined human episodic memory as that which “receives and 
stores information about temporally dated episodes or events, and temporal-spatial relations 
between them”. 
It has been suggested (e.g. Eacott & Norman 2004; Easton and Eacott, 2008) that 
external context (such as, but not limited to, location) is one important aspect of our 
memories which serves to differentiate the stream of experience into separate episodes or 
events. Thus a spatial shift to a new location may serve as a boundary marker in segmenting a 
continuous information input into discrete events. For example, when reading a text, reading 
speed slows around an implied shift in spatial location (Zwaan, Radvansky, Hillyard & 
Curiel, 1998) and memory for objects mentioned before a shift declines (Radvansky & 
Copeland, 2006). A similar effect has been noted with memory for objects seen in films 
(Boltz, 1992; Schwan & Garsoffky, 2004) and while navigating in virtual reality (Radvansky 
& Copeland 2006; Radvansky, Tamplin & Krawietz, 2010; Radvansky, Krawietz & Tamplin, 
2011; Horner, Bisby, Wang, Bogus & Burgess, 2016) and a real-life laboratory (Radvansky et 
al., 2011): in each case a shift of location marked an event boundary in memory evidenced by 
both less accurate and slower memory responses for objects encountered before the shift than 
after. This effect has been termed the location updating effect (Radvansky & Copeland, 
2006). As simple explanations of such effects (e.g. context-dependency: Murnane, Phelps & 
Malmberg, 1999) have been excluded (Radvansky et al., 2011), this effect has been 
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interpreted as revealing the effects of updating a cognitive event model (Radvansky et al., 
2010; Radvansky et al., 2011). 
A cognitive event model is a mental representation of the current event, a segment of 
time which the observer experiences as a connected whole, for example making a cup of tea 
or attending a meeting. Events can be organised hierarchically, such that the event of 
attending a meeting might itself be composed of sub-events such as informal pre-meeting 
catch-up with colleagues, formal discussion of X, post-meeting planning for Y, etc. 
(Richmond, Gold & Zacks, 2017). Event models represent the spatial-temporal context of the 
activity (Radvansky, 2017). According to two dominant and complementary accounts of the 
effect, Event Segmentation Theory (EST: Kurby & Zacks, 2007;  Zacks et al., 2007) and the 
Event Horizon Model (EHM: Radvansky, 2012; Radvansky & Zacks, 2011, 2014), the 
current event model can be viewed as a schema held in working memory and used to process 
on-going perceptions. The currently active event model influences what information is 
maintained in working memory. Thus perceiving an event boundary will require a new event 
model to be activated and previously active information associated with the previous event 
model will become inactive, although it may still be potentially retrievable from long-term 
memory. This process of updating to a new event model serves to segment the continuous 
stream of information into events in memory.  
The location updating memory effect is typically studied using a recognition memory 
paradigm (e.g. Radvansky et al., 2010; Radvansky et al., 2011). Participants view or interact 
with a series of objects while viewing or traversing a number of locations. Periodically, 
participants are presented with either a recently encountered object (positive probe) or novel 
object (negative probe) and asked “is this a recently encountered object?”, thus testing 
recognition memory for the objects. However, recognition memory testing in this way does 
not delineate the memory processes involved in making the memory judgement.  It has long 
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been argued (e.g. Mandler, 1980;  Yonelinas 1994; 2001) that such recognition judgements 
may reflect two distinct underlying processes: recollection and familiarity. Recollection is 
associated with a subjective experience of remembering the previous episode and involves 
bringing to mind information from the encoding event that was not present at test, while 
familiarity is a feeling that the event seems familiar in the absence of being able to generate 
any additional information from the encoding event.  The distinction between the memory 
processes underlying recollection and familiarity is supported by a number of lines of 
evidence, including effects in both brain damaged (e.g. Aggleton & Brown 2006; Edylstyn, 
Grange, Ellis & Mayes, 2015) and intact human observers (e.g. Yonelinas, 1994, Ameen-Ali, 
Norman, Eacott, & Easton, 2017).  To date, the contribution of recollection and familiarity to 
the location updating effect has not been investigated.  
The current study aims to replicate the location updating effect based on that used by 
Radvansky and colleagues (e.g. Radvansky & Copeland 2006; Radvansky et al., 2010; 
Radvansky et al., 2011) and extend it to examine the underlying memory processes involved.   
Participants navigated around a computer-generated environment consisting of a number of 
rooms, interacting with virtual objects within each room. As in the studies of Radvansky and 
colleagues (Radvansky & Copeland 2006; Radvansky et al., 2010; Radvansky et al., 2011), 
periodic recognition tests probed memory for objects that had been recently encountered, 
either shortly before or shortly after traversing to a new room (a location shift). Unlike the 
previous studies, participants were additionally asked about their subjective memory 
experience in making this recognition memory judgement. When participants judged that 
they recognised an object as one they had recently encountered, they were asked whether this 
judgement was based on a subjective experience of “remembering” the previous experience 
or on a feeling of “knowing” that it was familiar but in the absence of remembering.  This 
Remember/Know paradigm has been extensively used in the literature (e.g. see Yonelinas, 
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2001) to indicate the use of recollective and familiarity memory process respectively. In this 
way we examine the memory processes underlying the location updating effect.   
 
Methods 
Participants 
Fifty participants were recruited through an online Psychology subject pool available to 
undergraduate Psychology students at a UK university and given partial course credit for 
their participation or the chance of winning £50. Four participants did not complete the study 
after reporting motion sickness during the procedure. Two further participants were excluded 
after initial examination of their data: these participants scored 50% and 58% correct 
respectively (c.f. average of all other participants = 89%, range 71%-98%) and in both cases 
the pattern of responses to positive and negative probes suggested they had not engaged with 
the task. The results of the remaining 44 participants are therefore reported. The experiment 
was approved by the University’s Psychology Ethics Committee. 
 
Materials and apparatus 
The materials and apparatus were based on that of Radvanksy et al. (2011). The virtual 
environment was constructed, compiled and displayed using Mazesuite software (Ayaz, 
Allen, Platek, & Onaral, 2008; www.mazesuite.com) on a standard laptop. Participants were 
asked to navigate through a computer-generated virtual environment from a first-person 
perspective using the cursor keys to generate movement. The virtual space was a 55 room 
environment with rooms of two possible sizes: large rooms were twice as long as small 
rooms in order for Shift and No-Shift conditions to involve the same distance travelled. Small 
rooms contained one, and large rooms two, rectangular tables placed alongside a wall (see 
Figure 1). At one end of the table was the object to be picked up while the remainder of the 
6 
 
table was available to set down the object carried from a previous table. The tables were 
arranged such that the distance between the last object and the door was the same in both the 
long and the small room. In addition, the distance between the last object of table 1 in the 
long room and the first object of the table 2 was the same. The distance between Shift and no 
Shift probes was identical.  
Virtual objects were created by combining different colours (red, orange, yellow, 
green, blue, purple, white, brown, grey and black) and shapes (cube, wedge, pole, disc, cross 
and cone).  All combinations of colour and shape were possible as objects. 
 
Procedure 
After giving informed consent, participants were instructed in the use of remember/know 
judgements (Easton et al. 2012; Rajaram, 1993) and were encouraged to practice navigating 
the virtual environment without objects present using the arrow keys on a standard keyboard 
before beginning the study.  
Forty eight trials were presented in two blocks with a brief break between blocks. The 
study consisted of the participant navigating the environment, moving from table to table and 
between rooms. Close approach to a table allowed any carried object to be set down 
automatically and the object on the table to be picked up. When an object was being carried it 
disappeared from view so that participants had no visual cue as to the currently carried object. 
The 55-room environment contained 48 probe trials. Each probe trial consisted of three 
questions. First, a picture of an object appeared on the screen with the question “Is this an 
object you are carrying or recently have put down?”. Half the probe objects were objects that 
had been amongst the last two objects carried (positive probes) and half were objects which 
had not been recently carried (negative probes) but were generated by recombining the object 
and colour from the two positive objects. For example, if the carried object was a red cone, 
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and the set-down object a blue cube, the probe might be a blue cone. Half of the probes 
occurred after a shift to a new room (Shift condition) and half did not (NoShift condition). 
There were 24 positive probes and 24 negative probes, counterbalanced across conditions. 
Having responded to the probe object, participants were asked about their subjective 
experience, making a ‘Remember’, Know’, or ‘Guess’ judgement and, if remembered or 
known, to rate their confidence in the accuracy of their memory on a 4 point scale labelled 
very unconfident, unconfident, confident, very confident.  
Thus in total there were 48 probe trials, half of which occurred after a shift in location 
(Shift condition) and half not (NoShift condition). Within each condition half of the probes 
were positive and half negative. The condition (Shift/NoShift) and question type 
(positive/negative) of the probes was in random order. The experimental procedure was self-
paced but participants were encouraged to be fast and accurate and were aware that reaction 
times were being measured. The procedure typically lasted between 20 and 25 minutes.  
 
   
 
Figure 1. Screenshot of the virtual environment showing an object on a table with a doorway 
on the right-hand side.  
 
Results 
Following Radvansky et al., (2011), Table 1 shows the error rate and reaction time in each 
condition by question type.  A 2x2 repeated measure ANOVA of error rates on condition 
(Shift, NoShift) and question type (positive, negative) showed an effect of condition 
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(F=9.971, df= 1,43, p=0.03) such that the NoShift condition produced a lower error rate than 
the Shift condition. No effect of question type (F<1) nor interaction of condition and question 
type was found (F<1).  
  
 NoShift Shift 
 ErrorRate 
[95%CI] 
RT (all) 
[95%CI] 
RT (correct) 
[95%CI] 
ErrorRate 
[95%CI] 
RT (all) 
[95%CI] 
RT (correct) 
[95%CI] 
Positive 0.09 [0.05, 0.12] 
3208 
[2986, 3430] 
3181 
[2958, 3404] 
0.14 
[0.10, 0.17] 
3482 
[3262, 3701] 
3421 
[3201, 3641]  
Negative 
0.10 
[0.06, 0.13] 
3459 
[3239, 3678] 
3464 
[3243, 3685] 
0.12 
[0.09, 0.16] 
3607 
[3385, 3829] 
3608 
[3378, 3839] 
Table 1: Error rate and RT in Shift and NoShift condition by question type (positive vs 
negative) 
 
Following Radvansky et al. (2010), the reaction time data were trimmed by removing 
any response faster than 200 ms or slower than 10,000 ms as being implausibly fast or slow. 
This removed an average of 0.64 reaction times per participant. A 2x2 repeated measure 
ANOVA of reaction time on condition (Shift, NoShift) and question type (positive, negative) 
showed an effect of condition (F=19.604, df= 1,43, p<0.01) such that the NoShift condition 
produced faster reaction times than the Shift condition. There was also an effect of question 
type as negative responses are, as commonly found in the literature (e.g. Sternberg, 1966, 
Marcell,1970), slower than positive responses (F=20.689, df=1,43, p<0.01) but there was no 
interaction of condition and question type (F=2.425, df=1,43, p=0.127).   
Because differences in reaction times between-conditions might be affected by the 
above difference in error rates, the reaction times for correct responses only were analysed, 
again revealing an effect of condition (F=11.032, df= 1,43, p<0.01) such that the NoShift 
condition produced faster reaction times than the Shift condition. There was also the expected 
effect of question type (F=22.222, df=1,43, p<0.01) but no interaction of condition and 
question type (F=1.357, df=1,43, p=0.250).   
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Thus overall the results replicate the previous findings in the literature that walking 
through a doorway reduces accuracy and increases reaction times. As question type had no 
effect on response accuracy, it was not further analysed. 
 
Table 2 shows the number of correct responses and the percentage of correct 
responses by condition and experiential response. A 2 condition (Shift, NoShift) x 3 
experiential response (Remember, Know, Guess) ANOVA on the number of correct 
responses revealed as above a main effect of condition (F=9.188, df=1,43, p=0.004) as 
shifting location produced fewer correct responses overall. There was as expected also an 
effect of experiential response as Remember, Know and Guess responses were not equally 
common (F=305.127, df=2,86, p<0.001) but crucially there was an interaction of shift 
condition and experiential response (F=8.004, df= 2,86, p=0.001). Planned comparisons 
showed the number of correct responses associated with a Remember response significantly 
decreased when walking through a doorway (t=3.271, df=43, p=0.002) while in contrast 
following a location shift there was a marginally significant increase in the number of correct 
responses associated with a Know response (t=1.949, df=43, p=0.058).  The number of Guess 
responses was low overall and the number of such correct responses did not differ between 
conditions (t<1).  
 
 Condition 
 NoShift Shift 
  Absolute 
number 
[95%CI] 
Percent of responses 
in condition  
[95% CI] 
 Absolute 
number 
[95%CI] 
Percent of responses 
in condition  
[95% CI] 
Experiential 
response 
Remember 18.32  
[17.05, 19.59] 
83.6% 
[78.7, 88.4] 
16.50 
[15.09,17.92] 
78.0% 
[72.6, 83.4] 
Know 3.05  
[2.07, 4.02] 
14.2% 
[9.7, 18.6] 
3.80 
[2.90, 4.70] 
19.0% 
14.3, 23.6] 
Guess 0.48 
[0.27,0.69] 
2.3% 
[1.2, 3.5] 
0.61 
[0.31, 0.92] 
3.1% 
[1.5, 4.8] 
Total 21.85 100% 20.91 100% 
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Table 2: The number and percentage of correct responses by condition and experiential 
response [95%CI]. Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding effects. 
 
A similar analysis of the percentage of correct responses in each condition associated 
with each experiential response confirmed the conclusions of the above. There was, as 
expected, no effect of shift condition overall (F<1) as the data were the percent correct within 
condition and so summed to 100%. There was also, as expected, a highly significant effect of 
experiential response as each response was not equally common (F=835.618, df=1,43, 
p<0.001).  Crucially, there was again a significant interaction of experiential response and 
condition (F=6.131, df=1,43, p=0.017). Planned comparison showed that the percentage of 
correct responses associated with a Remember response decreased after walking through a 
doorway (t=2.642, df=43, p=0.011) while conversely the percentage of correct responses 
associated with a Know response increased (t=-2.504, df=43, p=0.016). There was no effect 
on Guess responses (t<1). 
 
It was possible that the differences between Remember and Know responses found 
above were influenced by a fall in memory confidence following a shift in location, as 
Remember responses are typically associated with high confidence while Know responses 
can vary across the confidence range (Yonelinas, 1994; 2001) . Consequently, an additional 
analysis was confined to high confidence responses only, defined as only those responses for 
which the participant rated their confidence as “confident” or “very confident” (see table 3). 
Guess responses are, by definition, not high confidence responses. 
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   Condition 
 NoShift Shift 
  Absolute 
number  
[95%CI] 
Percent of responses 
in condition  
[95% CI] 
 Absolute 
number  
[95%CI] 
Percent of 
responses in 
condition  
[95% CI] 
Experiential 
response 
Remember 17.70 
[16.45, 18.96] 
87.6% 
[83.0%, 92.2%] 
16.09 
[14.66, 17,52] 
82.6% 
[78.1%, 87.2%] 
Know 2.39 
[1.50, 3.28] 
12.6% 
[8.2%, 17%] 
3.05 
[2.31, 3.78] 
17.5% 
13.1%, 21.9%] 
total 20.09 100% 19.14 100% 
Table 3: The number and percentage of high confidence correct responses by condition and 
experiential response [95%CI]. Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding effects. 
 
A 2 (Shift, NoShift) x 2 (Remember, Know) repeated measures ANOVA on the number of 
high confidence correct responses again revealed a main effect of condition (F=5.042, 
df=1,43, p=0.03) as shifting location produced fewer high confidence correct responses 
overall. There was also the expected effect of experiential response as Remember and Know 
responses were not equally common (F=230.058, df=1,43, p<0.001), but crucially there was, 
as above, an interaction of shift condition and experiential response (F=8.18, df= 1,43, 
p=0.007). Planned comparisons showed that the number of high confidence correct responses 
associated with a Remember response significantly decreased following a location shift 
(t=3.083, df=43, p=0.004). In contrast there was no difference between the two conditions in 
the number of such correct responses associated with a Know response (t=1.814, df=43, 
p=0.077), although as before there was a numerical increase in correct Know responses after 
a location shift which approached significance.  
 
As above, a similar analysis based on percentage rather than absolute values was 
undertaken. This revealed, as before, no effect of shift condition (F=2.048, df=1,43, p=0.16) 
and a significant effect of experiential response (F=296.458, df=1,43, p<0.001). Crucially, 
there was again an interaction of shift condition and experiential response (F=6.213, df=1.43, 
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p=0.017), as correct high confidence Remember responses significantly decreased following 
a shift in location whereas correct high confidence Know responses conversely increased. 
 
In order to fully assess memory availability, reaction times by condition and 
experiential response were also analysed (Table 4). Because Guess responses were relatively 
uncommon across all participants, many participants had no correct Guess responses in one 
or more conditions and so for this reason, the reaction times for Guess responses were not 
included. Nonetheless 13 participants also had no correct responses in one or more category 
of shift condition x experiential response even when only Remember and Know responses 
were considered and so all reaction time data of these participants were also removed before 
analysis. A 2 (Shift, NoShift) x 2 (Remember, Know) ANOVA on reaction times for the 
remaining participants revealed a main effect of shift condition (F=16.678, df=1,30, p<0.001) 
such that correct responses in the shift condition were slower than those in the non-shift 
condition. There was also a significant effect of experiential response (F=7.990, df=1,30, 
p=0.008) as remember responses were faster than know responses but there was no 
interaction (F<1, df=1,30, p=0.332). 
 
 Condition 
 NoShift Shift 
  Reaction time 
[95%CI] 
High confidence 
reaction time  
[95% CI] 
 Reaction time 
[95%CI] 
High confidence 
reaction time  
[95% CI] 
Experiential 
response 
Remember 3179 
[2951, 3406] 
3222 
[2980, 3464] 
3462 
[3220, 3704] 
3481 
[3233, 3753] 
Know 3442 
3057, 3826] 
3368 
[2982, 3753] 
3914 
[3561, 4266] 
3948 
[3573, 4324] 
total 3310 
[3036, 3585] 
3295 
[3018, 3572] 
3678 
[3354, 4001] 
3715 
[3453, 3977] 
Table 4: Reaction time of correct responses by condition and experiential response. 
 
Due to the above discussed issue of confounds of confidence and experiential 
response, as above an analysis was also undertaken on the reaction times of high confidence 
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correct responses only (Table 4). An additional 3 participants had no high confidence 
responses in one or more category of shift condition x experiential response and so their data 
were removed before analysis. A 2 (Shift, NoShift) x 2 (Remember, Know) ANOVA on high 
confidence reaction times on the data from the remanding participants revealed a main effect 
of shift condition (F=15.534, df=1,27, p=0.001) such that high confidence responses in the 
shift condition were slower than those in the non-shift condition. There was also, as above, a 
significant effect of experiential response (F=5.457, df=1,27, p=0.027) but no interaction 
(F=2.346, df=1,27, p=0.137). 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of the current study was to investigate the memory processes underlying 
the location updating effect. Having first replicated the previously reported location updating 
effect (Radvansky & Copeland 2006; Radvansky, Tamplin & Krawietz, 2010; Radvansky, 
Krawietz &  Tamplin, 2011), our results reveal for the first time that this effect is seen only in 
memories experienced as remembered but not those experienced as known or those which the 
participant rated as guesses.  
The current study therefore adds to the literature on the updating effect and crucially 
allows it to be placed within the broader framework of memory processing. The interpretation 
of remember/know judgements has proved controversial but have been used as a basis to 
understand and model memory processes. One dichotomy in the literature is whether 
remember/know judgements reflect different memory strengths within a single process 
memory system (e.g. Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004 ) or are evidence of at least two 
dissociable memory processes (such as recollection and familiarity: Yonelinas 2001; Wixted 
& Mickes, 2010). For example, it has been suggested that differences in memory strength 
within a single process results in differences in both subjective experience and confidence: 
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high memory strength produces a confident experience of remembering and low memory 
strength results in a low confidence experience of knowing (Dunn 2004). Under this view, a 
lowering of memory strength as a result of a location shift could potentially be advanced as 
an explanation of some of our current findings: decreasing confidence would shift the 
subjective experience from high confidence remembering towards low confidence knowing. 
However, there is strong evidence from within our data that this is not the correct explanation 
of our findings. Even when only highly confident responses were analysed, accurate 
Remember responses still significantly decreased following a location shift, while accurate 
Know responses increased. This pattern of results is not consistent with an effect caused 
merely by a lowering of memory strength following a location shift. It is, however, consistent 
with a view that the experiences of remembering and knowing result from two dissociable 
processes: a location shift differentially affects those processes which are experienced as 
remembered but not those associated with the experience of knowing. The findings from the 
current study therefore support the view that remember and know judgements map onto the 
two processes of recollection and familiarity, although it is not claimed that this mapping is 
necessarily one-to-one (Wixted and Mickes, 2010). 
 One aspect of our data may at first seem paradoxical: shifting location appears to 
increase the familiarity of objects experienced in the previous location. However, it should be 
noted that an experience of Knowing is produced when one has the subjective experience of 
familiarity in the absence of remembering (Yonelinas 2001; Wixted & Mickes, 2010): as 
walking through a doorway has been seen to decrease the experience of remembering, in 
some cases this will reveal Know responses which were previously hidden by Remember 
responses. Thus walking through doorways does not increase familiarity of objects per se but, 
by decreasing Remember responses, may allow Know responses to more frequently reach 
experience. Similar increases in responses associated with familiarity have been seen 
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following decreases in recollective processes after hippocampal damage in both amnesic 
patients (Holdstock, Mayes, Gong, Roberts & Kapur, 2005) and rats (Easton, Zinkivsky, & 
Eacott 2009). 
The current study followed the existing literature by using a doorway as a marker of a 
change in location leading to event segmentation. While there is evidence that navigating 
virtual environments using arrow keys while sitting stationary at a computer as in our study 
produces cognitive activity similar to real navigation (Kahana, Sekuler, Caplan, Kirschen & 
Madsen), it is not crucial to the argument that the participants experienced a virtual location 
shift. The current findings are consistent with the view that more generally context changes 
including, but not limited to, spatial context serve to delineate episodes in episodic memory 
(e.g. Gaffan 1994; Eacott and Norman 2004; Eacott and Easton, 2010; Eacott & Norman 
2004; Easton & Eacott 2008).  Under this view, the concept of a context is broad and 
incorporates changes in spatial location, background context and temporal context as well as, 
for example, changes in task demands (Easton & Eacott, 2008). In the current study, Shift 
and NoShift conditions were intermixed and the probe questions were a constant time 
following object interaction regardless of condition, so there were no temporal cues that 
could serve as a marker of a change in context. Moreover the background context was 
physically the same between rooms so the only marker of a change in context was the act of 
navigating through a doorway to the next virtual room. It has been argued that by 
incorporating the context (spatial or otherwise) in which an event occurred into a memory 
representation, similar memories can be protected from interference (what-where-which 
occasion: Robertson, Eacott & Easton, 2015). In consequence, individuals who segment 
events effectively have been shown to have better memory for the events than those whose 
segmentation was less effective (Richmond et al., 2017; Zacks et al, 2006).  
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It might perhaps seem surprising that episodic memory processes such as recollection 
and familiarity have been implicated in such a task as the delay between object interaction 
and the memory probe, although dependent on the participant’s speed of navigation, was 
typically under 10 seconds. At such delays working memory might be assumed to be 
implicated rather than long-term episodic memory processes. However, various models of 
episodic memory assume a short-term buffer which may be implicated (e.g. Baddeley, 2012;  
Lehman & Malmberg, 2013). The episodic buffer of Baddeley’s working memory model 
(Baddeley, 2000; Baddeley, 2012), for example has been proposed as a multidimensional 
short-term store capable of holding integrated representations of features of objects (such a 
colour and shape) as well as integrating between working and long-term memory (e.g. 
Baddeley et al., 2011; Karlson et al., 2010). The use in the current study (and those of 
Radvansky and colleagues: Radvansky & Copeland 2006; Radvansky, Tamplin & Krawietz, 
2010; Radvansky, Krawietz &  Tamplin, 2011) of negative probe objects which recombined 
the colours and shape of recently encountered objects (positive probe objects) required an 
integrated representation of colour and shape for accurate responding and thus may have 
specifically required the episodic buffer. It is possible that a similar task that did not require 
such feature integration might be less reliant on the episodic buffer and thus less susceptible 
to the location updating effect, although this is at present untested. The episodic buffer is the 
least well explored aspect of Baddeley’s working memory model and its role is not yet fully 
elucidated, including its relationship to the subjective experience of remembering and so this 
model does not specifically make any predictions regarding the experience of remembering 
or knowing. In contrast, Lehman and Malmberg (2013) proposed a buffer model in which 
information is stored about items, and about associations between items and the context in 
which they were encountered. Given that the buffer has a limited capacity, in response to task 
demands items and associations may be removed from the buffer by a control process termed 
17 
 
compartmentalization. It is suggested that during a task such as the one in the current study, 
an episodic image of each object will be stored in the buffer and may be associated with the 
context (room) in which the object was seen. A context shift resulting from walking through a 
doorway may potentially result in removal of context associations within the buffer, leaving 
item only information. It has been suggested ( Mickes, Seale-Carlisle & Wixted, 2013 ) that 
Know judgments may often be based on such item-only information. These buffer accounts 
of our data are highly speculative but illustrate how the location updating effect may prove 
useful in further exploring how the stream of input available in working memory is 
segmented into events within episodic memory.   
In summary, the previously reported finding (Radvansky & Copeland 2006; 
Radvansky et al., 2010; Radvansky et al., 2011) that walking through a doorway reduces the 
availability of information in memory can be confirmed and extended. Memories associated 
with the experience of remembering are reduced but the number of those associated with the 
experience of knowing is not reduced, and may even be increased. This pattern of results is 
consistent with an interpretation of the effect occurring within the episodic memory system 
and can shed light both on the location updating effect and the processes of episodic memory.      
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